题目: Quality Control through Retailing Contracts-On the Role of Agricultural Cooperative

讲座人:余建宇 教授；西南财经大学 经济与管理研究院

主持人: 张彤 副教授

时间: 2018年11月15日（周四）  14:30-18:00

地点:华南农业大学 经管学院大楼 907室

讲座人简介:余建宇，西南财经大学经济与管理研究院教授，毕业于法国图卢兹经济学院。研究方向为产业组织理论，应用于农业、食品经济。研究成果发表于American Journal of Agricultural Economics，European Review of Agricultural Economics, Journal of Retailing, Economics Letters 等国际权威期刊，以及《经济研究》，《世界经济文汇》等国内权威期刊。先后主持国际自然科学基金青年项目， 国际合作交流项目，以及“中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金”项目。

Abstract: Agricultural cooperatives (coops) play an important role in coordinating production of different stakeholders along the agri-food production chain. However, empirical evidence in both developed and developing countries shows that coops are inefficient in providing quality and high-value added products. Question arises why coops still prevail in coordinating quality provision of retailers in the agri-food chain? Based on the theory of secret contract, we develop a model to investigate the behavior of farmers facing a representative retailer who uses contract to control quality of the agricultural product. We find that when the retailer deals with individual farmers and cannot observe individual quality, inefficiency arises because the retailer may have incentive to behave opportunistically and provide a contract that exploits the interest of other farmers, leading to inefficiency in quality provision. The outcome is the same as the free-riding outcome when farmers form a coop and sells directly to final market. However, when farmers form a coop and the retailer signs contract with the coop based on the average quality, the industry efficiency can be achieved because coop can be seen by the retailer as a commitment device to prevent the opportunistic behavior of the retailer. This paper thus provides a new explanation on the positive role of coop in quality provision along agri-food chain.